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COMPARISON OF RISK PERCEPTION BETWEEN DELINQUENTS AND NONDELINQUENTS*
DANIEL S. CLASTER
The author is a Research Associate at the Hawthorne Cedar Knolls School, Hawthorne, New York.
He is co-director of a research-demonstration project, supported by the National Institute of Mental
Health, which is concerned with a social system approach to milieu therapy for emotionally disturbed
and delinquent adolescent boys. Dr. Claster received the B.A. degree from Yale University in 1954
and the Ph.D. degree, in social psychology, from Columbia University in 1961. He was formerly
Instructor in Sociology at the University of Kentucky.
Delinquents have been said to differ from non-delinquents in the way in which they perceive the risk
of committing crimes. Such a difference may appear in sociological, psychological, or social-psychological terms. This study found evidence for differences at the psychological and social-psychological,
but not at the sociological level. The findings suggest that the greater "impulsivity" found among
delinquents is related to their feelings of immunity from the law.

The classical school of criminology asserts that
criminal behavior can be deterred by fear of
punishment." The positivist school does not reject this concept of deterrence, but it rejects the
classical assumption that deterrence is equally
applicable to all persons. By emphasizing differences in crime proneness, 2 positivism views de-

terrence in terms of factors that make some
persons less susceptible to threatened sanctions
than others. 3
The present study was undertaken to determine
whether different susceptibilities to sanctions can
be explained by differences in perceiving the risk
of arrest and conviction for criminal behavior. A
questionnaire was constructed to measure risk
perception. Using official statistics4 as a baseline,
delinquents and non-delinquents are first compared as to how they perceive arrest and conviction rates for various crimes. Second, their
perceptions of the risk to themselves of arrest
and conviction for three hypothetical offenses
are compared.
' The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr.
A. Lee Coleman, Director, Social Research Service,
University of Kentucky, for support of the study, to
Messrs. Owen Clifford, Ben Freeman, Lyle Lauber,
Samuel Noe, and Gerald Rossell for making subjects
available, and especially to Miss Lois Cassell for
pretesting the questionnaire.
I BEccARIA, AN EssAY ON CISu AND PUNISHMENTS 31 (1819).
2VOLD, THoRETicAL CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1958).
3 Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and
Law, 46 J. CRr. L., C. & P.S. 347 (1955).
4The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Annual
Uniform Crime Reports present comparable data of this
sort from law enforcement agencies throughout the
United States.

Three major hypotheses are tested: (a) delinquents perceive law enforcement, measured
by percentage of crimes cleared by arrest and
conviction in the United States, to be less effective
than do non-delinquents; (b) delinquents see
themselve as more likely to violate the law in
hypothetical situations than do non-delinquents;
and (c) delinquents perceive their chances of apprehension and conviction for these hypothetical
offenses to be less than non-delinquents perceive
their own chances. Hypothesis (a) reflects the
position that delinquents view the external world
differently from non-delinquents, (b), that delinquents perceive themselves differently from
non-delinquents, and (c), that delinquents differ
in how they perceive themselves in relation to
the larger social environment.
The first hypothesis is an example of the sociological approach to criminality. 5 That view
explains criminality as part of a larger cultural
pattern, characteristic of persons who have been
socialized in groups which support anti-social
values. Members of these groups begin early to
learn about police inefficiency and corruption,
unfair court practices, etc. They are exposed to
adults who make a living, frequently a good
living, by crime. Among them, the idea does not
exist of law as a desirable institution, assented
to by society's members to protect themselves.
On the contrary, they see it as an obstacle to
desired goals and are attuned to the weaknesses
of the legal structure. If this view of delinquent
5
Glaser, The Sociological Approach to Crime and
Correction, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoa. 683 (1958).
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subcultures is correct, that they are characterized
by considerable skepticism of the general efficiency of law-enforcement, then this skepticism
should lead members of these groups to make
lower judgments of arrest and conviction rates
for the United States than others not so acculturated, as predicted by the hypothesis.
Hypothesis (b) is addressed to the conceptualization of delinquency as a psychological impulse
disorder.' It is based on two assumptions: first,
that offenders are less capable of controlling the
impulse to act out in an anti-social fashion, and
second, that this tendency is in some way accessible to conscious awareness. Previous studies
encourage us to pursue this hypothesis. Reckless,
Dinitz, and Murray found non-delinquents higher
on the social responsibility scale of the California
Personality Inventory than delinquents, which is
indicative of greater "social control" according to
Gough, who developed the scale.7 Another study,
using Cattell's Junior Personality Questionnaire,
showed delinquents high on impulsivity (surgency
scale).8 Our hypothesis differs from the findings
of these studies in that it operationalizes impulsivity situationally, by describing hypothetical
circumstances in which an individual might commit a criminal offense through loss of control,
while the studies cited measure impulsivity as a
more general personality characteristic.
The third hypothesis expresses what Redi and
Wineman call the "delusion of exceptionalistic
exemption from the laws of cause and effect".'
They describe how delinquents develop a peculiar
notion involving both self-perception and perception of law-enforcement: that they themselves
are immune from the legally prescribed consequences of their misdeeds. For such individuals,
visible enforcement against others and even
against themselves when they have previously
been caught is said to have no deterrency effect.
Describing this defect in reality testing, Schmideberg notes:
One of the most striking things about offenders
is that they do not believe that they will ever
6

McCoRD

& McCoRD, PSYcHOPATnY AND DELiN-

QuENcy 8 (1956).
7 Reckless, Dinitz, & Murray, Self Concept as an

Insulator against Ddinquency, 21 Am. Socio. R v. 744
(1956).
8
Kelly and Veldman, Ddinquency and School Behavior as a Function of Impulsivity and Nondominant
Values, 69 J. AmB. & Soc. PsYcHoL. 190 (1964).
9 REDL & WINA,

(1957).
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be caught or brought to justice. Even after
going to jail, many believe that they will
never be caught again. They have a magical
belief in their own cleverness, luck, or whatever they call it-often in obvious contrast
to the facts. One patient expressed to me, as
an explanation for committing his offenses,
his "sense of gloating" that he got away. I
said, somewhat amazed, "But you did not
get away, you got arrested several times".
In his mind he had managed to deny the fact
of the arrests and dwelt only on the occasions
when he had escaped. 10
This phenomenon derives from the impulsivity
attributed to delinquents in the second hypothesis,
but the third hypothesis goes further and holds
that impulsivity is not confronted:.squarely; to,
do so would be too painful because it would evoke
the fear of apprehension and punishment. This
view posits that delinquents' deny' their lack of
control by perceiving themselves to be beyond
the reach of the law. Insofar as it.characterizes
delinquency in terms relating personality to perception of the social environment, it may be called
a social-psychological hypothesis.
MTHOD
A questionnaire was constructed to measure
the perceptions hypothesized among delinquents
and non-delinquents. It consists of three parts.
In the first part there are six items. Each item
consist of a definition of one class of. criminal
offense, an example of that offense, and a question
requiring respondents to check one of four percentage figures, at ten per cent intervals, which
they believe correctly represents the "cleared by
arrest" rates for that crime. The first item is:
"Murder-killing a person on .purpose. For instance: a man plans to kill his wife. He buys a
gun, takes it home, and shoots her. What per
cent of murders end up with someone being arrested for the crime? 62%, 72%, 82%, 92%."
Similar items are included for the crimes of negligent manslaughter, aggravated assault, robbery,
burglary, and auto theft.
The second part of the questionnaire contains
six items that ask respondents to give the percentage of persons arrested for the crimes mentioned in the first part who are convicted.
In both these parts, one of the alternatives is
10
Schmideberg, Tie Offender's. Attitu4 , toward
Piunishnent,51 J. Cmmn. L., C. & P. S. 332 (1960).
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based on official statistics for the year 1960.11
Alternatives are presented in ascending order in
each item. The position of the correct alternative
is varied for the twelve items in the first two parts
of the questionnaire, so that it comes first in
three cases, second in three cases, etc.
The third part of the questionnaire consists of
three hypothetical situations in which a criminal
act results from the absence of customary control.
The first situation is one of anger giving way to
murder; the second, burglary resulting from
financial necessity; and the third, careless driving
leading to vehicular homicide. For each situation
there are three questions, sections a, b, and c.
In section a the respondent is asked whether he
thinks he definitely could, probably could, probably could not, or definitely could not commit
the acts in the situations described. Only if he
definitely could, or probably could, is he to answer
sections b and c for that situation. Section b
asks him to judge whether his chances of evading
arrest, if he did commit such an act, would be
greater, less than, or equal to 50%, and section
c asks what he perceives his chances of conviction
if arrested to be, given the same forced-choice
alternatives as in section b.
The delinquents to whom questionnaires were
administered consisted of all the inmates in the
sixth grade and above at the training school for
juvenile offenders of one of the East South Central
states. Non-delinquent responses were obtained
from all the eighth and ninth grade boys who were
assigned to study halls at a given hour, at a lower
to lower-middle class school in a large city in that
state.u Only questionnaires from white male
respondents were used in the analysis reported
here. Training school respondents with I.Q.
scores less than 80 were also excluded.
The 42 delinquents remaining range in age
from 13 years, 7 months to 18 years, 9 months,
with a median of 15 years, 10 months. Their
median I.Q. measured by the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (W.I.S.C.) is 95, with a
range from 80 to 117.
"U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform
Crime Reports 13, 15 (1961).
'2 Unfortunately, it was not possible to ascertain
whether any of the public school boys had been convicted of delinquency, but we assume that the incarcerated subjects were more delinquent than those
at liberty. If questionnaires of convicted delinquents
could have been purged from the public school group,
the probably effect would have been to increase the
magnitude of difference found.
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The 65 boys in the non-delinquent group range
in age between 13 years, 1 month and 16 years,
1 month; the median is 14 years, 2 months. Their
I.Q. scores are based on the California Test of
Mental Maturity, and extend from 90 to 133
with a median of 109.
Questionnaires were administered to both
training school and junior high school students
in class groups during school hours. The stated
purpose of the questionnaire was "to find out
people's ideas of how laws work in the United
States". Respondents were assured of confidentiality by being told the investigator would
not reveal their answers to anyone at their schools.
An incentive was offered-a two-dollar prizefor the person in each school who had the most
correct answers on items 1 through 12, those
questions for which there are "correct" answers.
The items in the first part, per cent of reported
crimes cleared by arrest, and items in the second
part, per cent of arrested persons who were convicted, were scored in this same way. A correctly
estimated item received a score of 0. If the correct
per cent was overestimated by 10 points the
item was scored +1, by 20 points, +2, by 30
points +3, and corresponding minus scores were
given for underestimation.
The six items in each part were combined in
two ways for each respondent. One consisted of
simply counting the number of correct responses
he gave. The other consisted of adding the overestimation and underestimation scores to arrive
at a net plus or minus score, reflecting tendency
to overestimate or underestimate. Thus the
first six items yielded a score for number of correct estimates and a score for over, or under,
estimation of the cleared by arrest rates for the
crimes included. In like manner the second six
items yielded a score for correctness and an overestimation or underestimation score for conviction rates.
In the third part of the questionnaire, the a
sections of items 13, 14 and 15, asking whether
respondents thought they might commit the
criminal acts in the situations given, were scored
on a four point scale, "definitely could" equal to
three points and "definitely could not" equal to
zero points. These scores were then summed
across the three situations to reflect self-perceived
absence of control. Sections b and c were similarly
scored on a three point scale, high scores reflecting
perception of relative likelihood of arrest and
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TABLE 1
COmpAsuSON OF DELINQUENTS AN NON-DELINQUENTS ON OvEREsTBIATIoN

AND CoRRECTNEss OF U.S. ARREST

AND CONVICTION RATES FOR Six CiWrs

Mean overestimation of arrest rates ...................
Mean overestimation of conviction rates ...............
Mean number of correct arrest rate estimates ..........
Mean number of correct conviction rate estimates ......

Delinquents

Non-Dein-

(N = 42)

quents (N = 65)

.38
4.05
2.31
1.67

- .26*
4.09
2.06
1.48

I

1.20
.08
1.10
.97

Level of
Significance

p
p
p
p

<
>
<
<

.20t
.90t
.40t
.40t

* Minus score indicates mean underestimation.
t One-tailed test.
t Two-tailed test.
conviction, respectively. Because section b and c
were to be answered only if the response to section
a of the corresponding situation was "definitely
could" or "probably could", individuals' summated scoies for sections b and c were sometimes
based on one response, sometimes on two and
sometimes on three. In order to give each individual equal weight in comparing groups, the
summated b and c scores were divided by the
number of responses appropriate for him. 3
RESULTS

Results of the analysis of the first two parts
of the questionnaire are given in Table 1. None
of the differences between means for delinquents
and non-delinquents reached the criterion of significance at the .05 level. The direction of the
difference which did appear for estimates of the
cleared by arrest rate was opposite to that hypothesized: mean judgment of delinquents was
an overestimate of .38 points, while that of nondelinquents was an underestimate of .26 points.
In judgment of conviction rate there was virtually
no difference between delinquents and non-delinquents; both groups overestimated by a little
more than 4 points.
No hypothesis as to accuracy of judgments
has been advanced. It was felt that the selective
experiences of delinquents and non-delinquents
would lead each group to systematic distortion,
but there was no reason to think the degree of
distortion would be greater for one group than
the other. Nevertheless, the data were analyzed
to see if there is such a difference. It turns out
that the mean number of correct estimates by
'3If
respondents did not acknowledge that they
probably could commit any of the acts there would be
no responses in sections b and c. Of course, such respondents were omitted in the analysis of these sections.

delinquents is slightly greater than that for nondelinquents, both in arrest rate and conviction
rate estimates, but the probability is two in five
that these differences are due to chance, so that
the hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected
with confidence.
Tables 2 and 3, however, which deal with selfperceptions, indicate more striking differences
between delinquents and non-delinquents. In
Table 2 the delinquent group is higher, with a
mean score of 4.75, than non-delinquents, whose
mean is 3.57, in the extent to which they think
themselves prone to commit crimes by failing to
exercise self control in situations where such
controls are normally expected to operate. This
difference, analyzed by the Mann Whitney U
test, turns out to be highly significant; there are
only three chances in a thousand that it is due to
sampling error.
Table 3 is based on only those boys who admitted that they might commit one or more of
the offenses in the three situations described;
thus two of the original forty-two training school
boys and twenty-three of the sixty-five junior
high school respondents previously used were
omitted from the analysis of sections b and c of
questions 13, 14 and 15. Comparing those who
remained in these groups, the hypothesis that
delinquents perceive themselves to be more immune from arrest than non-delinquents was
strongly confirmed. Non-delinquents' score for
self-perceived likelihood of being arrested is 1.54,
while that for delinquents is 1.18, a difference
significant at the .003 level of confidence.
Self-perceptions as to probability of conviction
if arrested for these offenses differ in the same
direction as probability of arrest 'between the
groups, but the difference does not reach an ac-
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF DELINQUENTS AND NoN-DELINQUENTS ON PERCEPTION OF LIKELiHooD THAT THEY COULD
COMMIT THREE HYPOTHETICAL CRIMES

* One-tailed test.
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF DELINQUENTS AND NioN-DELINQUENTS ON PERCEPTION OF OWN LIxELnHOOD OF ARREST AND
CONVICTION IF TiHEY COMMITTED HYPOTHETICAL CnRS

Self-perceived likelihood of being arrested .............................
Self-perceived likelihood of being convicted .............................

Delinquents
(N = 40)

Non-delinquents
(N = 42)

z

Level of Significance*

1.18

1.54

2.73

p = .003

1.29

1.39

1.13

0 = .13

* One-tailed test.

ceptable level of significance. The non-delinquents
estimated the likelihood for themselves of conviction if arrested with an average score of 1.39
points, and the delinquents' average score was
1.29. The difference between them might have a
one-eighth probability resulting from chance,
though, so that it cannot be taken as a real difference.
As noted above, there were differences between
training school and public school boys on two
attributes, age and IQ, in addition to the main
independent variable, current incarceration for
delinquency. Thus it was necessary to examine
the relationship between these antecedent variables and the scores on which delinquents differed
from non-delinquents, to determine whether the
delinquent-non-delinquent differences are artifacts of the group differences in age and IQ. For
this purpose, both training school and public
school boys were divided into subgroups of those
above and below the group median in age. Those
below the median were then compared with those
above, within each group, on the scores for which
significant delinquent-non-delinquent differences
were found. The results indicated no significant
differences between older and younger boys in
questionnaire responses. Similar comparisons of
higher-IQ with lower-IQ boys likewise revealed no
differences. 'Thus the possibility that delinquent-

non-delinquent differences in questionnaire scores
are explainable by age and IQ differences between
the groups is not supported.
DISCUSSION

Taking our findings as a whole, they support
an explanation of the differential impact of deterrence in terms of differences in personality
expressed as perceptions of self vis-a-vis the legal
structure. The delinquent group's greater selfperceived propensity to engage in violations,
confirming hypothesis (b), and greater belief in
ability to evade arrest, confirming the first part
of hypothesis (c), provides quantitative evidence
for the "magical immunity" mechanism posited
in psychoanalytic ego psychology. Moreover, it
suggests a more careful examination of the greater
"impulsivity" attributed to delinquents. Frequently, the concept of "impulsivity" carries
with it the connotation that some force overwhelms the individual's attempts to restrain
himself-for example, the legal notion of "irresistible impulse" implies that some effort is
made to resist. However, the indication in this
study that the presumed effect of sanctions is
significantly less applicable to delinquents suggests that the exercise of restraint is repressed,
and appears in consciousness as distorted self
perception.
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At what point does this distorted perception
come about? The delinquents had committed
their delinquent acts and been incarcerated before
expressing their perceptions for this study, so that
perceptual distortion cannot be taken to have preceded delinquency. To demonstrate perception as
causal, it would be necessary to administer the
questionnaire to non-delinquents and to predict
delinquency from it. Yet the present findings are
striking just because the perception of immunity
was shown among boys who were caught and incarcerated, many of them repeatedly, for delinquent offenses.
The mechanism of perceptual distortion leads
delinquents to perceive themselves invulnerable to
arrest, but there is not a correspondingly significant difference in perceived immunity from conviction. Why does the mechanism operate selectively? Perhaps the very fact that the first part
of the hypothesis was confirmed explains the
failure to confirm the second part: if a magical
belief in immunity from arrest serves to neutralize
fear of punishment, a simultaneous belief in
immunity from conviction is unnecessary. An
alternative explanation is that the delinquent
may be able to develop a rationale to support the
delusion of arrest immunity on the basis of abilities
he thinks he has in the area of crime commission
and evasion of arresting authorities, but the process of trial conviction, in which the principal
actors are lawyers, judges, etc., may be too remote to support such a rationale.
Failure to confirm the first hypothesis supports
the view, recently advanced by Matza, 4 that the
discrepancy between delinquents' and nondelinquents' relations to larger social processes
has been heretofore greatly exaggerated. Inkeles 5
has argued cogently for interpreting the interplay
between social structure and behavior by means
of mediating psychological processes, and the
Gluecks' approach1 6 to delinquency provides an
example of such interpretation. As a whole, our
findings lend support to interpretations at this
level.
The present investigation bears on two areas of
inquiry not usually concerned with criminology.
One of these, the study of decision-making under
DELNQUENCY AND DR= 62 (1964).
16Inkeles, Personality and Social Structure, in MER14MATZA,

TON, BROOM,

& COTTRELL, SOCIOLOGY TODAY 249

(1959).
6
' GLuEcE & GLUECK,
DELINQUENCY 278 (1950).

UNRAvELING
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conditions of risk,17 has received much recent
research attention. McClelland and others have
shown that a particular pattern of risk preference
is characteristic of persons 'oriented toward
achievement through socially acceptable channels."
If the delinquent is also seen as motivated to
achieve, but differs from the middle class achiever
in the criteria of success, 19 he, too may turn out
to have the middle class achiever's pattern. of
risk preference. Future research might explore the
relation between perception as measured in
this study, risk preference, and achievement
motivation among delinquents.
A second area concerns the relation between
fear of punishment and the sense of morality. As
child psychology explains it, normal development
consists of "internalizing" prohibitions, so that the
fear of external punishment becomes a moral
standard, which then produces conformity in the
absence of situational sanctions.20 Part of the
"ethical risk" hypothesis which was confirmed
by Rettig and Rawson holds that unethical behavior depends on expectancy of censure.2 1 Aronfreed has shown that middle class children are
more likely to give self-critical responses to stories
of transgression, while working class children
focus more on external responsibility.Y Sears,
Maccoby and Levin have studied some of the
socialization practices which are likely to lead
to such "internalization",3 and Redl and Wine'TThis approach has been applied to formal legal
decisions on the part of judges, jurors, and enforcement
officers. ExAwPLFs &

ScHUBERT, JUDICIAL DECISION

(1963); Strodtbeck, Social Process, the Law,
and Jury Functioning, in EvAN, LAW AND SOCIOLOGY
152 (1962); LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE
A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965). A study in progress
by Kaplan, which applies decision theory to the criminal
process, is mentioned in a recent survey, Skolnick,
The Sociology of Law in America: Overview and Trends,
13 SOCIAL PROBLEMS SUPPLEMENT ON LAW AND
SOCIETY 36 (1965).
' McClelland, Risk Taking in Children with High
and Low Need for Achievement, in ATKINSON, MOTIVES
IN FANTASY, AcTION, AND SOCIETY 306 (1958); Atkinson, Bastian, Earl & Litwin, The Achievement Motive,
Goal Setting, and ProbabilityPreferences, 60 J. ABN. &
SoC. PSYCHOL. 27 (1960).
19 CoHEN, DELINQUENT Boys 27 (1955).
20Kohlberg, Moral Development and Identification,
in STEVENSON, CBILD PSYCHOLOGY 277 (1963).
2 Rettig and Rawson, The Risk Hypothesis in
PredictiveJudgments of UnethicalBehavior, 66 J. ABN. &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 243 (1963).
22Aronfreed, The Nature, Variety, and Social Patterning of Moral Responses to Transgression, 63 J. ABN.
& SoC. PSYcHOL. 223 (1961).
MAKING

2 SEARS, MACCOBY & LEVIN, PATTERNS OF CHILD
REARING 362 (1957).
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man describe a program for helping children
develop internal controls.n But these methods do
not bear directly on the task of a psychotherapist
concerned with how to correct deficiencies in
internal control for persons whose characters
have reached a relatively stable equilibrium.
Schmideberg sees the aims of psychotherapy with
2

1REDL

(1952).

& WmIuAN, CONTROLs FRom WITHIN
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offenders as threefold: to sensitize them to social
pressure, to develop a normal attitude toward
punishment, and to teach them to foresee consequences and be motivated rationally by such
foresight.25 The present study supports this focus
by confirming the location of offenders' problems
as a distortion of self perception in relation to
the real world.
25Schmideberg, supra note 10, at 334.

